INTRODUCTION
The issue of the application of mathematics to natural science has received a great deal of consideration in the last few years (see, for instance, Field [1980] and [1989] , Hellman [1989] , Steiner [1989] and [1998] , and Shapiro [1997] ). In this paper, I am concerned with two tasks: (1) to provide a formal framework to accommodate one important aspect of this issue − the heuristic use of mathematics in theory construction − and (2) to illustrate how this framework works by focusing on a particular case-study: von Neumann's use of logic and set theory in his work in the foundations of quantum mechanics. The reason to consider von Neumann's work derives from the interplay of mathematical, logical and heuristic considerations that he wove together in the process of providing an axiomatization for quantum mechanics and exploring some of its consequences. Moreover, his work provides important insights into the nature of theory construction in physics.
As we shall see below, we cannot separate von Neumann's attitude towards mathematics from his attitude towards logic. He was searching for a unified approach to physics, where logic, mathematics and probability nicely hang together. This approach naturally raises the issue of the cognitive status of logic and mathematics in von Neumann's view. In addressing this issue, what I want to establish is that there are three major empiricist trends in von Neumann's work: (i) von Neumann was an empiricist in his view of mathematics (in the sense that mathematical theories are often created from empirical demands); (ii) von Neumann was also an empiricist with regard to logic (in the sense that logic should be inspired and modified by experience; moreover, in his view, there are as many logics as physical phenomena demand). Finally, (iii) in developing his approach to the foundations of quantum mechanics, von Neumann countenanced an empiricist version of the semantic approach (stressing the empirical adequacy of scientific theories, rather 1 Many thanks to Philip Catton, John Christie, Newton da Costa, Christian de Ronde, Steven French, Graeme Gooday, and Jon Hodge for helpful discussions. Special thanks go to Steven French for comments and suggestions on earlier versions of this work. This paper was written after I spent some time consulting the von Neumann Archives (Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.). I think a new picture of von Neumann's work in logic and the foundations of quantum mechanics emerges once we consider the material kept there. than their truth). In this way, we have a new understanding of von Neumann's accomplishments, and we can determine the cognitive status he assigned to them.
But to represent the moves made by von Neumann in the articulation of his approach, we need a particular formal framework. One of the contentions of the present work is that the framework developed by da Costa and French − the partial structures approach − is helpful here. This framework has two major components: an open-ended notion of structure (partial structure) and a weak concept of truth (quasi-truth). Both notions received a formal characterization in a number of interesting papers by da Costa (see da Costa [1986] , and Mikenberg, da Costa and Chuaqui [1986] ), and in later works, da Costa and French have provided extensive applications of them to various problems in the philosophy of science (see da Costa and French [1989] , [1990] , [1993a] , [1993b], and [2003] ). In my view, this framework helps us to understand von Neumann's work in the foundations of physics; so let me first say a few things about it. 
PARTIAL STRUCTURES AND QUASI-TRUTH
The partial structures approach (see Mikenberg et al. [1986] , and da Costa and French [1989] , [1990] , and [2003] ) relies on three main notions: partial relation, partial structure and quasi-truth. One of the main motivations for introducing this proposal comes from the need for supplying a formal framework in which the "openness" and "incompleteness" of information dealt with in scientific practice can be accommodated. This is accomplished firstly by extending the usual notion of structure, in order to model the partialness of information we have about a certain domain (introducing then the notion of a partial structure). Secondly, the Tarskian characterization of the concept of truth is generalized for such "partial" contexts, advancing the corresponding concept of quasi-truth.
The first step, that paves the way to introduce partial structures, is to formulate an appropriate notion of partial relation. When investigating a certain domain of knowledge Δ (say, the physics of particles), we formulate a conceptual framework which helps us in systematizing the information we obtain about Δ. This domain is represented by a set D of objects (which includes real objects, such as configurations in a Wilson chamber and spectral lines, and ideal objects, such as quarks). D is studied by the examination of the relations holding among its elements. However, it often happens that, given a relation R defined over D, we do not know whether all the objects of D (or n-tuples thereof) are related by R. This is part and parcel of the "incompleteness" of our information about Δ, and is formally accommodated by the concept of partial relation. The latter can be characterized as follows. Let D be a non-empty set. An n-place partial relation R over D is a triple 〈R 1 ,R 2 ,R 3 〉, where R 1 , R 2 , and R 3 are mutually disjoint sets, with R 1 ∪R 2 ∪R 3 = D n , and such that: R 1 is the set of n-tuples that (we know that) belong to R, R 2 is the set of n-tuples that (we know that) do not belong to R, and R 3 is the set of n-tuples for which it is not known whether they belong or not to R. (Note that if R 3 is empty, R is a usual nplace relation which can be identified with R 1 .) 2 The formal framework presented below is part of a broader program whose main task is to articulate a constructive empiricist philosophy of mathematics (see Bueno [2009] ), thus extending van Fraassen's proposal to this domain (see van Fraassen [1980] , [1985] , [1989] , and [1991] ). Although I have no plans to elaborate on this program here, let me just make one point. As is well known, the aim of science for the constructive empiricist is not truth, but something weaker − empirical adequacy (van Fraassen [1980] , p. 12). Similarly, the aim of mathematics in the present proposal is accordingly weaker. It is not truth, but quasi-truth (roughly speaking, truth with regard to a limited domain).
However, in order to represent appropriately the information about the domain under consideration, we need a notion of structure. The following characterization, spelled out in terms of partial relations and based on the standard concept of structure, is meant to supply a notion which is broad enough to accommodate the partiality usually found in scientific practice. A partial structure A is an ordered pair 〈D,R i 〉 i∈I , where D is a non-empty set, and (R i ) i∈I is a family of partial relations defined over D.
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We have now defined two of the three basic notions of the partial structures approach. In order to spell out the last one (quasi-truth), we will need an auxiliary notion. The idea is to use the resources supplied by Tarski's definition of truth. But since the latter is only defined for full structures, we have to introduce an intermediary notion of structure to link it to the partial ones. This is the first role of those structures which extend a partial structure A into a full, total structure (which are called A-normal structures). Their second role is model-theoretic, namely to put forward an interpretation of a given language and to characterize semantic notions. Let A = 〈D,R i 〉 i∈I be a partial structure. We say that the structure B = 〈Dʹ,Rʹ i 〉 i∈I is an A-normal structure if (i) D=Dʹ, (ii) every constant of the language in question is interpreted by the same object both in A and in B, and (iii) Rʹ i extends the corresponding relation R i (in the sense that, each Rʹ i , supposed to be an n-place relation, is not necessarily defined for all n-tuples of elements of Dʹ). Note that, although each Rʹ i is defined for all n-tuples over Dʹ, it holds for some of them (the Rʹ i1 -component of Rʹ i ), and it doesn't hold for others (the Rʹ i2 -component).
As a result, given a partial structure A, there are several A-normal structures. Suppose that, for a given n-place partial relation R i , we don't know whether R i a 1 ...a n holds or not. One way of extending R i into a full Rʹ i relation is to look for information to establish that it does hold, another way is to look for the contrary information. Both are prima facie possible ways of extending the partiality of R i . But the same indeterminacy may be found with other objects of the domain, distinct from a 1 , ..., a n (for instance, does R i b 1 ...b n hold?), and with other relations distinct from R i (for example, is R j b 1 ...b n the case, with j ≠ i?). In this sense, there are too many possible extensions of the partial relations that constitute A. Therefore, we need to provide constraints to restrict the acceptable extensions of A.
In order to do that, we need first to formulate a further auxiliary notion (see Mikenberg, da Costa and Chuaqui [1986] ). A pragmatic structure is a partial structure to which a third component has been added: a set of accepted sentences P, which represents the accepted information about the structure's domain. (Depending on the interpretation of science which is adopted, different kinds of sentences are to be introduced in P: realists will typically include laws and theories, whereas empiricists will add mainly certain laws and observational statements about the domain in question.) A pragmatic structure is then a triple A = 〈D,R i ,P〉 i∈I , where D is a nonempty set, (R i ) i∈I is a family of partial relations defined over D, and P is a set of accepted sentences. The idea is that P introduces constraints on the ways that a partial structure can be extended (the sentences of P hold in the A-normal extensions of the partial structure A).
Our problem is, given a pragmatic structure A, what are the necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of A-normal structures? Here is one of these conditions (Mikenberg et al. [1986] ). Let A = 〈D,R i ,P〉 i∈I be a pragmatic structure. For each partial relation R i , we construct a set M i of atomic sentences and negations of atomic sentences, such that the former correspond to the n-tuples which satisfy R i , and the latter to those n-tuples which do not satisfy R i . Let M be ∪ i∈I M i . Therefore, a pragmatic structure A admits an A-normal structure if and only if the set M∪P is consistent.
Assuming that such conditions are met, we can now formulate the concept of quasi-truth. A sentence α is quasi-true in a pragmatic structure A = 〈D,R i ,P〉 i∈I if there is an A-normal structure B = 〈Dʹ,Rʹ i 〉 i∈I such that α is true in B (in the Tarskian sense). If α is not quasi-true in A, we say that α is quasi-false in A. Moreover, we say that a sentence α is quasi-true if there is a pragmatic structure A and a corresponding A-normal structure B such that α is true in B (according to Tarski's account). Otherwise, α is quasi-false.
The idea, intuitively speaking, is that a quasi-true sentence α does not necessarily describe, in an appropriate way, the whole domain to which it refers, but only an aspect of it − the one modeled by the relevant partial structure A. For there are several different ways in which A can be extended to a full structure, and in some of these extensions α may not be true. Thus, the notion of quasi-truth is strictly weaker than truth: although every true sentence is (trivially) quasi-true, a quasi-true sentence is not necessarily true (since it may be false in certain extensions of A).
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It may be argued that because quasi-truth has been defined in terms of full structures and the standard notion of truth, there is no gain with its introduction. In my view, there are several reasons why this is not the case. Firstly, as we have just seen, despite the use of full structures, quasi-truth is weaker than truth: a sentence which is quasi-true in a particular domain − that is, with respect to a given partial structure A − may not be true if considered in an extended domain. Thus, we have here a sort of "underdetermination" − involving distinct ways of extending the same partial structure − that makes the notion of quasi-truth especially appropriate for the empiricist. Secondly, one of the points of introducing the notion of quasi-truth, as da Costa and French ([1989] and [1990] ) have argued in detail, is that in terms of this notion, a formal framework can be advanced to accommodate the "openness" and "partialness" typically found in science. Bluntly put, the actual information at our disposal about a certain domain is modeled by a partial (but not full) structure A. Full, A-normal structures represent ways of extending the actual information which are possible according to A. In this respect, the use of full structures is a semantic expedient of the framework (in order to provide a definition of quasi-truth), but no epistemic import is assigned to them. Thirdly, it is possible to dispense with full structures in the formulation of quasi-truth, since the latter can be characterized in a different way, but still preserving all its features, independently of the standard Tarskian type account of truth (Bueno and de Souza [1996] ). This provides, of course, the strongest argument for the dispensability of full structures (as well as of the Tarskian account) vis-à-vis quasi-truth. Therefore, full, A-normal structures are entirely inessential; their use here is only a convenient device.
To illustrate the use of quasi-truth, let us consider an example. As is well known, Newtonian mechanics is appropriate to explain the behavior of bodies under certain conditions (say, bodies which, roughly speaking, have "low" velocity, are not subject to strong gravitational fields, etc.). But with the formulation of special relativity, we know that if these conditions are not satisfied, Newtonian mechanics is false. In this sense, these conditions specify a family of partial relations, which delimit the context in which the theory holds. Although Newtonian mechanics is not true (and we know under what conditions it is false), it is quasi-true; that is, it is true in a given context, determined by a pragmatic structure and a corresponding A-normal one (see da Costa and French [1993a] ). 
PARTIAL ISOMORPHISM AND PARTIAL HOMOMORPHISM
In empirical research, we often lack complete information about the domain of inquiry. We know that certain relations definitely hold for objects in the domain, and others clearly don't; but for a number of relations we simply don't know (given our current information) whether they hold or not. Typically, we have at best partial structures to represent our information about the domain under investigation (and this includes not only empirical structures, but also theoretical ones). As a result, partial structures help us to accommodate the partiality of our information (see French [1997] ).
But what is the relationship between the various partial structures articulated in a particular domain? Since we are dealing with partial structures, a second-level of partiality emerges: we can only establish partial relationships between the (partial) structures at our disposal. This means that the usual requirement of introducing an isomorphism between theoretical and empirical structures can hardly be met. Relationships weaker than full isomorphisms, full homomorphisms etc. have to be introduced, otherwise scientific practice − where partiality of information appears to be ubiquitous − cannot be properly accommodated (for details, see French [1997] , French and Ladyman [1997] , and Bueno [1997] ).
Following a related move made elsewhere (see French and Ladyman [1999] , Bueno [1997] , French and Ladyman [1997] , and Bueno, French and Ladyman [2002] ), it is possible to characterize, in terms of the partial structures approach, appropriate notions of partial isomorphism and partial homomorphism. And because these notions are more open-ended than the standard ones, they accommodate better the partiality of structures found in science. Here they are:
Let S = 〈D, R i 〉 i∈I and Sʹ = 〈Dʹ, Rʹ i 〉 i∈I be partial structures. So, each R i is of the form 〈R 1 ,R 2 ,R 3 〉, and each R' i of the form 〈Rʹ 1 ,Rʹ 2 ,Rʹ 3 〉.
We say that a partial function f: D → Dʹ is a partial isomorphism between S and Sʹ if (i) f is bijective, and (ii) for every x and y ∈ D, R 1 xy ↔ Rʹ 1 f(x)f(y) and R 2 xy ↔ Rʹ 2 f(x)f(y). So, when R 3 and Rʹ 3 are empty (that is, when we are considering total structures), we have the standard notion of isomorphism.
Moreover, we say that a partial function f: D → Dʹ is a partial homomorphism from S to Sʹ if for every x and every y in D, R 1 xy → Rʹ 1 f(x)f(y) and R 2 xy → Rʹ 2 f(x)f(y). Again, if R 3 and Rʹ 3 are empty, we obtain the standard notion of homomorphism as a particular case. 6 5 Can the partial structures approach help the constructive empiricist to develop a philosophy of mathematics? I think it can. As I mentioned above, the main idea is that mathematics doesn't have to be true to be good, but only quasitrue; that is, true with regard to a possible domain − the one delimited by certain mathematical structures. It turns out that quasi-truth also extends van Fraassen's own account of empirical adequacy, which is ultimately truth with regard to a limited domain − that of the observable (for details, see Bueno [1997] ). Thus, a unified empiricist view (encompassing mathematics and empirical science) can be articulated using the partial structures approach. 6 Note that the notions of partial isomorphism and partial homomorphism can also be formulated in second-order logic. Hence, given Boolos's [1985] plural quantifier, they are acceptable by the nominalist.
Using these notions, we can provide a framework for accommodating the application of mathematics to theory construction in science. The main idea, roughly speaking, is to bring structure from mathematics to an empirical domain. In other words, mathematics is applied by "bringing structure" from a mathematical domain (say, functional analysis) into a physical, but mathematized, domain (such as quantum mechanics). What we have, thus, is a structural perspective, which involves the establishment of relations between structures in different domains. (Note that, at the level we are considering here, the physics is already mathematized.) But, as Redhead [1975] has nicely spelled out, there is typically "surplus" structure at the mathematical level (see also French [1999] ). And given this "surplus", only some structure is brought from mathematics to physics; in particular those relations which help us to find counterparts, at the empirical domain, of relations that hold at the mathematical domain. In this way, by "transferring structures" from a mathematical to a physical domain, empirical problems can be better represented and examined. This assumes, of course, that we have information about the relations between the two domains, although it may well not be complete. Only the information we know to hold is used; but there are other relations at the mathematical level that may not have any counterpart at the empirical level. (This will become clear in the discussion of von Neumann's work below.)
It is straightforward to accommodate this situation using partial structures. The partial homomorphism represents the situation in which only some structure is brought from mathematics to physics (via the R 1 -and R 2 -components, which represent our current information about the relevant domain), although "more structure" could be found at the mathematical domain (via the R 3 -component, which is left "open"). Moreover, given the partiality of information, just part of the mathematical structures is preserved, namely that part about which we have enough information to match the empirical domain.
By bringing structure from one domain into another, the application of mathematics has a heuristic role in theory construction: it suggests a way of searching for relations at the empirical domain, given their counterparts at the mathematical level. However, since mathematical theories don't have to be true to be applicable, but only quasi-true, the empiricist is allowed to use these theories without incurring into unacceptable ontological commitments.
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Of course, far more could be said about these issues. But here I am only concerned with presenting the overall formal framework assumed by the present proposal (in terms of partial structures, quasi-truth, and partial isomorphisms and homomorphisms). However, I hope enough has been said to indicate that this framework can be taken by the empiricist to provide an account of the role of structure in the application of mathematics (see Bueno [2009] and [2013] ). To illustrate these points, we shall see now how this framework can be used to consider von Neumann's application of mathematics to physics.
VON NEUMANN, LOGIC AND THE APPLICATION OF MATHEMATICS

The 1925-1926 mess
Von Neumann's work in the foundations of quantum mechanics emerged in a context where there was a demand for a proper mathematical formulation of the theory. The demand arouse out of what can be called the "1925-1926 mess". In these years, two entirely distinct formulations of quantum mechanics were devised: on the one hand, Heisenberg, Born, and Jordan formulated, in a series of papers in 1925, the so-called matrix mechanics; on the other hand, in 1926, also in a series of works, Schrödinger articulated wave mechanics. 8 The two formulations couldn't be more different. Matrix mechanics is expressed in terms of a system of matrices defined by algebraic equations, and the underlying space is discrete. Wave mechanics is articulated in a continuous space, which is used to describe a field-like process in a configuration space governed by a single differential equation. However, despite these differences, the two theories seemed to have the same empirical consequences. For example, they gave coinciding energy values for the hydrogen atom.
Schrödinger's explanation for this was to claim that the two theories were equivalent, and this was the main point of one of his papers of 1926. In the opening paragraph of this work (Schrödinger [1926] ), in which he tried to establish the equivalence, Schrödinger notes:
Considering the extraordinary differences between the starting-points and the concepts of Heisenberg's quantum mechanics [matrix mechanics] and of the theory which has been designated "ondulatory" or "physical" mechanics [wave mechanics] [...] it is very strange that these two new theories agree with one another with regard to the known facts where they differ from the old quantum theory. That is really very remarkable because starting-points, presentations, methods and in fact the whole mathematical apparatus, seem fundamentally different. Above all, however, the departure from classical mechanics in the two theories seems to occur in diametrically opposed directions. In Heisenberg's work the classical continuous variables are replaced by systems of discrete numerical quantities (matrices), which depend on a pair of integral indices, and are defined by algebraic equations. The authors themselves describe the theory as a "true theory of a discontinuum". On the other hand, wave mechanics shows just the reverse tendency; it is a step from classical point mechanics towards a continuum-theory. In place of a process described in terms of a finite number of dependent variables occurring in a finite number of differential equations, we have a continuous field-like process in configuration space, which is governed by a single partial differential equation, derived from a Principle of [Least] Action. (Schrödinger [1926] , pp. 45-46; for a discussion, see Muller [1997], pp. 49-58) According to Schrödinger, despite the conceptual and methodological differences, the two theories yielded the same results because they were equivalent. His strategy to prove the equivalence was clear enough: to establish an isomorphism between the canonical matrix-and wave-operator algebras. This was, of course, a straightforward strategy.
The problem, as Muller indicates ([1997] , pp. 52-53), is that Schrödinger only established a mapping that assigns one matrix to each wave-operator, but he didn't establish the converse. More surprisingly, Schrödinger himself acknowledges this point. In a footnote to his paper, he remarks:
In passing it may be noted that the converse of this theorem is also true, at least in the sense that certainly not more than one linear differential operator [wave-operator] can belong to a given matrix. [...] [However] we have not proved that a linear operator [wave-operator], corresponding to an arbitrary matrix, always exists. (Schrödinger [1926], p. 52) In other words, the equivalence between matrix and wave mechanics hasn't been proved after all. The claim that Schrödinger established the result in 1926 is therefore a "myth" (Muller [1997] ).
Given the importance of the two theories, and since they were thought of as having the same empirical consequences, it comes as no surprise that to establish the equivalence between them was taken as a substantial achievement. There were several attempts to do so. Dirac, for instance, provided a distinctive approach (see Dirac [1930] ). As is well known, his main idea was to put each self-adjoint operator in diagonal form. And this approach in fact succeeds in putting matrix and wave mechanics in a uniform setting. But it faces an unexpected problem: it is inconsistent! In the case of those operators that cannot be put in diagonal form, Dirac's method requires the introduction of "improper" functions with self-contradictory properties (the so-called δ-functions). However, from the viewpoint of classical mathematics, there are no such functions, since they require that a differential operator is also an integral operator; but this condition cannot be met.
Von Neumann's equivalence proof
Given the failure of these two attempts to establish the equivalence between matrix and wave mechanics, an entirely new approach was required to settle the issue. This was one of von Neumann's achievements in his [1932] book on the mathematical foundations of quantum mechanics. But von Neumann's involvement with foundational issues in quantum mechanics started earlier. In a paper written in 1927 with Hilbert and Nordheim, the problem of finding an appropriate way of introducing probability into quantum mechanics had been explicitly addressed (see Hilbert, Nordheim and von Neumann [1927] ). The approach was articulated in terms of the notion of the amplitude of the density for relative probability (for a discussion, see Rédei [1997] ). But it faced a serious technical difficulty (which was acknowledged by the authors): the assumption was made that every operator is an integral operator, and therefore Dirac's problematic function had to be assumed. As a result, an entirely distinct account was required to adequately introduce probability in quantum mechanics. And this led to von Neumann's 1932 work, using Hilbert spaces.
Von Neumann's book is the development of three papers that he wrote in 1927 (for a discussion and references, see Rédei [1997] and ). It is distinctive not only for its clarity, but also for the fact that there is no use of Dirac's δ-function. Probabilities are introduced via convenient trace functions, and relevant operators (projection operators) are defined on Hilbert spaces. So, von Neumann is able to claim that there is indeed a way of introducing probabilities in quantum mechanics without inconsistency (see von Neumann [1932] ).
What about the equivalence between matrix and wave mechanics? In von Neumann's hand, the problem becomes an issue of structural similarity. Bluntly put, von Neumann realized that there was a similarity of structure between the theory of Hilbert spaces and quantum mechanics, and that we could adequately represent claims about quantum systems by exploring the geometry of Hilbert spaces. But how can we accommodate this intuition? That is, how can we accommodate the structure similarity that von Neumann found between quantum mechanics and part of functional analysis? 9 In a nutshell, structure similarity can be accommodated via an appropriate morphism between the structures under consideration; that is, by a transformation which preserves the relevant (features of those) structures. Of course, the strongest form of morphism is isomorphism − the full preservation of structure. However, the use of this notion would be inappropriate in this case, for the following reason. By 1927, quantum mechanics could be seen as a semi-coherent assemblage of principles and rules for applications. Weyl's 1931 book was an attempt to impose a degree of coherence via the introduction of group-theoretic techniques (the uncertainty principle, for example, could be obtained via group theory). Dirac's 1930 work represents a further attempt to lay out a coherent basis for the theory. However, as von Neumann perceived, neither of these offered a mathematical framework congenial for the introduction of probability at the most fundamental level, and this was one of the major motivations for the introduction of Hilbert spaces. (There is, of course, a great deal more to be said about this, but here is not the place to do so.) Given this, there is no way of spelling out the similarity of structure between quantum mechanics (as it was at the end of 1920's and the beginning of 1930's) and Hilbert spaces in terms of the existence of full isomorphisms. Moreover, since there is more structure in functional analysis than was actually used by von Neumann in his axiomatization of quantum mechanics, we can say that the relationship between those "quantum" and mathematical structures is captured by appropriate partial homomorphisms. The partiality involved in the formulation of quantum mechanics is then captured by the partial nature of the homomorphism − only those components of quantum mechanics about which we have enough information are "preserved".
An important feature of von Neumann's axiomatization was his systematic search for analogies between mathematical structures and between the latter and "physical" structures (that is, structures employed in the description of physical phenomena).
10 These analogies played an important role in von Neumann's equivalence proof of matrix and wave mechanics. What von Neumann established is a mathematical relation between two systems of functions. And, in this case, the relation is a full isomorphism. On the one hand, we have functions − defined on the "discrete" space of index values Z = (1, 2, ...) − which are sequences x 1 , x 2 , ..., and are used in the formulation of matrix mechanics; on the other hand, we have functions defined on the continuous state-space Ω of a mechanical system (Ω is a k-dimensional space, with k being the number of classical mechanical degrees of freedom), and Ω's functions are wave functions ϕ(q 1 ,...,q k ). Von Neumann explicitly points out that the spaces Z and Ω are quite different ([1932] , p. 28). It is not surprising then that Dirac's method of unification faced so many mathematical difficulties, since this method assumed a direct analogy between Z and Ω (see von Neumann [1932] , pp. 17-27).
The method [...] resulted in an analogy between the "discrete" space of index values Z [...] and the continuous state space Ω [...] . That this cannot be achieved without some violence to the formalism and to mathematics is not surprising. The spaces Z and Ω are in reality very different, and every attempt to relate the two must run into great difficulties. (von Neumann [1932], p. 28) However, the correct analogy is not between the spaces Z and Ω, but between the functions defined on them. Von Neumann calls the totality of functions on Z, satisfying certain conditions, F Z , and the totality of function on Ω, also satisfying certain conditions, FΩ ([1932], pp. 28-29) . Once this point is clearly seen, von Neumann presents his equivalence proof. But note that what he proved is that F Z and FΩ are isomorphic, and therefore his theorem is restricted to the mathematical structures employed in matrix and in wave mechanics. Their physical content, as it were, is left untouched.
And it was here that finding the right analogy paid off. For it was the existence of the mathematical equivalence (between F Z and FΩ) that led von Neumann to search for a more basic mathematical formulation for quantum mechanics. However, since F Z was nothing but a Hilbert 10 The way in which the partial structures approach accommodates analogies in science has been described by da Costa and French [1990] ; for further details, see also French [1997] , French and Ladyman [1997] , and da Costa and French [2003] . I think this account can be extended to mathematics, but won't be able to explore the point here.
space, it was natural to adopt a slightly more abstract formulation of it − not tied to the particular features of F Z − as the basis for shaping the structure of quantum mechanics. In von Neumann's own words:
Since the systems F Z and FΩ are isomorphic, and since the theories of quantum mechanics constructed on them are mathematically equivalent, it is to be expected that a unified theory, independent of the accidents of the formal framework selected at the time, and exhibiting only the really essential elements of quantum mechanics, will then be achieved, if we do this: Investigate the intrinsic properties (common to F Z and FΩ) of these systems of functions, and choose these properties as a starting point.
The system F Z is generally known as "Hilbert space". Therefore, our first problem is to investigate the fundamental properties of Hilbert space, independent of the special form of F Z or FΩ. The mathematical structure which is described by these properties (which in any specific special case are equivalently represented by calculations within F Z or FΩ, but for general purposes are easier to handle directly than by such calculations), is called "abstract Hilbert space". (von Neumann [1932] , pp. 32-33; the italics are mine)
In other words, once the right analogy is found − that is, once the appropriate structural relationship is uncovered − the crucial step is taken. The rest is to explore the consequences.
Quasi-truth, empiricism and quantum mechanics
Let us reflect on what von Neumann is doing here. He is bringing some structure from functional analysis, by using the theory of abstract Hilbert spaces, and he is using this structure to provide the basis for quantum mechanics. Does this require that the theory of Hilbert spaces is true? By no means: the only requirement is that it has the adequate structure; that is, that it provides a system of functions which generalizes the mathematical properties satisfied by F Z and FΩ. We can think of the latter as partial structures A (in the sense that they would provide partial information about a given physical system). What von Neumann is doing is to overcome that partiality by finding a convenient "A-normal structure", which extends and generalizes the relations in A − and this is the abstract Hilbert space. In this sense, the only requirement is the quasi-truth (and not the truth) of Hilbert space theory. In other words, we need only the possibility that there is a structure that extends the partial information contained in A.
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These features − the idea that a mathematical theory doesn't have to be true to be applicable and the role of analogies in theory construction in mathematics − suggest that von Neumann's mathematical practice might be captured by the framework developed here. As is well known, according to van Fraassen, a scientific theory doesn't have to be true to be good, but only empirically adequate (van Fraassen [1980] , p. 12). Similarly, in this account of von Neumann's approach, a mathematical theory doesn't have to be true to be applicable, but only consistent with a particular physical description (in the present case, consistent with quantum mechanics). In this way, a mathematical theory has only to be quasi-true to be applicable (where the body of accepted sentences P provides the relevant accepted information from physics). Moreover, just as analogies are explored in the construction of physical theories (see French [1997] , and French and Ladyman [1997] ), the same goes in the case of mathematics, as the discussion of the equivalence between matrix and wave mechanics clearly indicates.
But there is a third feature worth considering in von Neumann's application of mathematics. It concerns the role of logic in this process − and as we shall see, von Neumann has a pluralist and empiricist view about logic. According to him, there is a plurality of logics, depending on the particular context we study, and such logics should be constrained by experience. As we shall also see, pluralism and empiricism about logic support the empiricist framework advanced here. They entail that logic is motivated by experience, and they strengthen the role of analogies between mathematics and physics as part of the development of physics and mathematics. In this sense, experience has a double role of generating logics and demanding further mathematical structures. In what follows, I shall elaborate on these points.
Logic and empiricism
As I have indicated, with the introduction of Hilbert spaces in quantum mechanics, von Neumann made a top-down move from mathematical to physical theories. Now what I intend to delineate is the corresponding bottom-up move in von Neumann's thought as one goes from experience through logic to highly abstract mathematical structures.
One of the outcomes of von Neumann's approach to quantum mechanics was the creation of quantum logic. He showed that we can formulate a family of propositions that describe the state of a physical system, in such a way that the geometrical structure underlying this family gives us information about the physical system. The idea is found in von Neumann's 1932 book, and is developed further in the celebrated 1936 paper by Birkhoff and von Neumann, where "quantum logic" as such was first introduced.
The study of the geometry associated with the relevant family of propositions give us its "logic". In the case of classical mechanics, the family of propositions generate a Boolean algebra, but in the context of quantum mechanics, we have "a sort of" projective geometry. The reason for the proviso is that in the 1936 paper, Birkhoff and von Neumann only consider physical systems with a finite number of degrees of freedom (that is, whose states can be characterized by finitely many parameters, in a state-space with a finite dimension). Now, with this finiteness assumption, the resulting "logic" (which is isomorphic to the projective geometry of all subspaces of a finitedimensional Hilbert space) is indeed a projective geometry. But the question arises as to the logic of a physical system that has infinitely many degrees of freedom. Von Neumann explicitly addressed this problem in the work he produced after the 1936 paper with Birkhoff. And his solution was to provide a generalization of projective geometry, which led to the formulation of continuous geometry and to what is now called von Neumann algebras of Hilbert space operators (see von Neumann [1960] and , Murray and von Neumann [1936] , and for a discussion, Bub [1981a] and [1981b] , and Rédei [1997] , [1998], and [2000] , and Rédei and Stöltzner (eds.) [2000] ).
In other words, it was because of von Neumann's pluralism that he was concerned with determining the logics adequate to each particular domain − moving from finite physical systems (represented by projective geometry) to infinite ones (represented by continuous geometry). Moreover, it was because of his empiricism that he undertook the search for distinct logics based on experience, that is the various types of physical systems we have to accommodate. In other words, the case of the generalization of projective geometry (continuous geometry) is a clear example of a mathematical theory that is created from physical, empirical demands. I shall call this von Neumann's first empiricist feature. Let us consider some others.
The 1937 manuscript: logics and experience
In an unpublished manuscript, written about 1937, von Neumann discusses his view about the status of logic and alternative logical systems (see von Neumann [1937a] ). This work was written shortly after the publication of Birkhoff and von Neumann [1936] , and von Neumann's chief task is to explore some consequences of the approach to logic left unnoticed in the 1936 paper.
The manuscript begins with a remark making it clear that it was not part of what was then considered work in the "foundations" of mathematics:
We propose to analyze in this note logics from a point of view which is fundamentally different from the one current in present-day "foundations" investigations. While we are not questioning at all the great importance and value of those investigations, we do believe that our present system of logics is open to criticism on other counts also. And it seems to us that these other "counts" are at least as fundamental and essential as those which form the subject-matter of the current "foundations" analysis. (von Neumann [1937a] , p. 1) Von Neumann had several reasons for not being satisfied with the then dominant foundational research. The most important of them was the entirely a prioristic way in which that research was typically conducted. Logic was essentially taken as classical logic, and there was hardly any room for the development of logics that were specific and appropriate to the particular domain of science under consideration. As opposed to this, the approach favored by von Neumann was much more directly connected with and inspired by the connection of logics with the physical world, and particularly also with probability. For this reason we even see some point in the proposition that [the problems this approach generates] deserve precedence over the generally considered problems of "foundations". (von Neumann [1937a] , p. 1; the italics are mine) According to von Neumann, it is crucial to have room for the articulation of logics that are faithful to the domain in question. In fact, he goes still further claiming that logics should be inspired by experience.
The basic idea [of this approach to logic] is that the system of logics which one uses should be derived from aggregate experiences relative to the main application which one wishes to make − logics should be inspired by experience. (von Neumann [1937a] , p. 2; the italics are mine)
In other words, not only the construction of mathematical theories, but also the construction of logical systems is heuristically motivated by experience − in order for the resulting logic to be adequate to the domain in question − and a logic should also reflect the main traits of the empirical domain. Logic should be inspired by experience (this is von Neumann's second empiricist feature).
However, as well as being heuristically inspired by experience, a logic can also play a critical role, being open to revision on empirical grounds:
If any accepted physical theory which has a reasonable claim to "universality" permits to draw inferences concerning the structure of logics, these inferences should be used to reform logics, and not to criticize the theory. (von Neumann [1937a] , pp. 2-3; the italics are mine)
In other words, a logic can be revised on empirical grounds (third empiricist feature). As a result, a logic is relative to a particular domain of inquiry. And relying on this revisability principle, von Neumann provides a further argument against the traditional approach to logic:
We hope to show on the pages which follow that an absolutely consequent application of this principle leads to very plausible results, and particularly to more natural ones than the usual, rigidly dogmatic, attitude in logic. (von Neumann [1937a] , p. 3) All these considerations (especially the domain-dependence of logic) become completely clear with quantum logic, which as is well known, due to the demands of quantum phenomena, lacks the distributivity of classical logic. In von Neumann's own words:
Quantum mechanics is a particularly striking example of how a physical theory may be used to modify logics − and for this reason it was first investigated in [Birkhoff and von Neumann [1936] ]. (von Neumann [1937a] , p. 3; the italics are mine) However, von Neumann has something still more radical to advance:
We propose to show in this note that even classical mechanics is incompatible with the usual system of "infinite" (or "transcendental") logics [that is, logics which are not related to experience]. We will determine the system of logics to which classical mechanics lead. We will see that this system lends itself much better to an extension to "probability logics" − which is an absolutely indispensable one if we bear in mind the modern developments of physical theory. (von Neumann [1937a], p. 3) But once this is achieved, something more will be established:
We will also see that this "classical mechanical" system of logics, when combined with the "finite" "quantum mechanical" system of logics given in [Birkhoff and von Neumann [1936] ], leads to a satisfactory, general "infinite" system of "quantum mechanical" logics, which contains also probability theory. (von Neumann [1937a], pp. 3-4) And these are the "plausible results" that von Neumann referred to above in his criticism of the "dogmatic" approach to logic. Therefore, the picture that emerges from this paper involves, firstly, pluralism (there are as many logics as physical phenomena demand); secondly, anti-apriorism (the demand for new logics arises from experience); and thirdly, empirically driven change (logic is open to change via empirical considerations). These are, of course, three features that are cherished by the empiricist. In this sense, there is more to logic than the a priori exploration of the logical consequence relation, and the main features of a logic should be obtained from, and modified by, experience (the domain of application).
Given the empiricist features of von Neumann's account of logic (in particular, given the idea that logic is open to change via empirical considerations), it is interesting to note that von Neumann thought that his account was comparable to the criticism of classical logic made by intuitionist and relevant logicians. As he points out in his paper with Birkhoff on the logic of quantum mechanics:
The models for propositional calculi which have been considered in the preceding sections are also interesting from the standpoint of pure logic. Their nature is determined by quasi-physical and technical reasoning, different from the introspective and philosophical considerations which have had to guide logicians hitherto. Hence it is interesting to compare the modifications which they introduce into Boolean algebra, with those which logicians on "intuitionist" and related grounds have tried introducing. (Birkhoff and von Neumann [1936] , p. 119; the italics are mine.) However, as Birkhoff and von Neumann point out, there is a crucial distinction between the criticisms of classical logic as articulated by the quantum and the intuitionist logicians:
The main difference seems to be that whereas logicians have usually assumed that properties L71-L73 of negation [namely, (Aʹ)ʹ = A; A ∧ Aʹ = f; A ∨ Aʹ = t; A → B implies Bʹ → Aʹ] were the ones least able to withstand a critical analysis, the study of mechanics points to the distributive identities L6 [A ∨ (B∧C) = (A∨B) ∧ (A∨C) and A ∧ (B∨C) = (A∧B) ∨ (A∧C)] as the weakest link in the algebra of logic. (Birkhoff and von Neumann [1936], p. 119) In their view, their own approach was closer to that of the relevant logician:
Our conclusion agrees perhaps more with those critiques of logic, which find most objectionable the assumption that Aʹ ∨ B = t implies A → B. (Birkhoff and von Neumann [1936], p. 119) All these principles (pluralism, anti-apriorism, and empiricism) are forcefully articulated in von Neumann's work on quantum logic, since he thinks this logic is fully adequate for the quantum domain, and it is importantly different from classical logic (even if one is a fragment of the other). In my view, not only has von Neumann adopted these methodological and epistemological principles but also he has fruitfully explored them to develop several of his most lasting contributions. In other words, these principles have informed von Neumann's research, providing him with heuristic guidelines for theory construction. Of course, all this can be clearly seen with the development of quantum logic. Now, we have here a sophisticated interaction between mathematics, logic and physics. As von Neumann articulated them, logics (such as quantum logic) are inspired by experience, but once articulated they generate new mathematical structures (such as the continuous geometry demanded by physical systems with infinitely many degrees of freedom). Such structures are in turn applied to model physical phenomena. Of course, once mathematical structures are formulated, they can also be studied in purely mathematical terms, independently of any concern with physics − as von Neumann's own mathematical work with continuous geometry beautifully illustrates (see, for instance, von Neumann [1981] ).
So we have here a movement from the bottom up, from experience through logic to highly abstract mathematical structures (from quantum logic to continuous geometry), in addition to the movement from the top down, from mathematical structures down to experience. The latter move was described earlier with von Neumann's use of the theory of Hilbert spaces in the formulation of quantum mechanics.
Returning now to von Neumann's 1937 manuscript, we can see another aspect of his pluralism. According to von Neumann, in order to have a proper understanding of classical mechanics we need an appropriate logic, and even in this case, we need logics that are nonclassical ("probability logics"), in the sense that weaker, probabilistic "implication" relations among statements are invoked. The idea is not that the Kolmogorovian notion of probability is non-classical, but rather that there are probabilistic "implication" relations. This proposal is explored further in another unpublished manuscript, whose subject is quantum logic (von Neumann [1937b] ; I present the details of the approach in the discussion of this manuscript in Section 4.7 below). In this article, von Neumann outlined four possibilities concerning the interplay between the "dimension" of a physical system and its logic, each alternative leading to an appropriate logical system. The four cases are: (i) a system "which behaves in the sense of classical physics (in particular mechanics) and which posses only a finite number of possible different states" (von Neumann [1937b] , p. 11); (ii) a system similar to (i) but in which the number of states is discretely infinite; (iii) a system similar to (i) but in which the number of states is continuously infinite; and finally (iv) a system where the "finiteness of [the number of states] remains essentially untouched, but the 'classical' way of looking at things (as practiced in [(i)-(iii)]) is replaced by a 'quantum mechanical' one" (von Neumann [1937b] , p. 16). Moreover, von Neumann also advanced a final synthesis, combining "these two kinds of extensions", namely from the finite to the infinite, and from the "classical" to the "quantum" approach (ibid.). Unfortunately, this is an unfinished work, and von Neumann only discussed case (i) (see von Neumann [1937b], pp. 11-15) .
But note that the three methodological and epistemological principles mentioned above play a heuristic role at this point. What led von Neumann to consider these four possibilities concerning a physical system was: (a) his logical pluralism (since he was searching for logics appropriate to the domain under study, whether it is classical or quantum physics); (b) his anti-apriorism (by refusing to adopt a logic which was not properly motivated by experience), and (c) his empiricism with regard to logic (which required an empirical investigation to determine the adequacy of a logic to the physical domain in question). In this sense, these principles have informed and supported von Neumann's research.
The status of mathematics
It is important to note that I am not saying that von Neumann was an empiricist about logic and mathematics in the naive, and untenable, sense that these disciplines are empirical. Once motivated by empirical considerations, logic and mathematics are developed and articulated as deductive disciplines in the standard way. And the adoption of this standard practice is absolutely clear in von Neumann's own mathematical writings.
For instance, von Neumann criticized Dirac for his introduction of the δ-function on mathematical grounds, along the lines I have previously indicated (see von Neumann [1932] , pp. 23-27). According to von Neumann, since this function lies "beyond the scope of mathematical methods generally used", and he desires to "describe quantum mechanics with the help of these latter methods" (ibid., p. 27), he moves on to his own formulation of quantum mechanics in terms of Hilbert spaces. This surely illustrates the importance von Neumann saw in subscribing to standard methods of mathematical research. As he insists:
The method of Dirac, mentioned above (and this is overlooked today in a great part of quantum mechanical literature, because of the clarity and elegance of the theory), in no way satisfies the requirements of mathematical rigor − not even if these are reduced in a natural and proper fashion to the extent common elsewhere in theoretical physics. For example, the method adheres to the fiction that each self-adjoint operator can be put in diagonal form. In the case of those operators for which this is not actually the case, this requires the introduction of "improper" functions with self-contradictory properties. The insertion of such a mathematical "fiction" is frequently necessary in Dirac's approach, even though the problem at hand is merely one of calculating numerically the result of a clearly defined experiment. (von Neumann [1932], pp. viii-ix) However, von Neumann points out:
There would be no objection here if these concepts [Dirac's "improper" functions] , which cannot be incorporated into the present day framework of analysis, were intrinsically necessary for the physical theory. Thus, as Newtonian mechanics first brought about the development of the infinitesimal calculus, which, in its original form, was undoubtedly not self-consistent, so quantum mechanics might suggest a new structure for our "analysis of infinitely many variables" − i.e., the mathematical technique would have to be changed, and not the physical theory. (von Neumann [1932], p. ix) This passage illustrates the extension of von Neumann's empiricism: he would be prepared to change the standard mathematical techniques, if this were required by our physical theories. And the precedent for this in the case of Newtonian mechanics is surely well taken. Nevertheless, von Neumann continues:
But this is by no means the same case. It should rather be pointed out that the quantum mechanical "Transformation theory" can be established in a manner which is just as clear and unified, but which is also without mathematical objections. It should be emphasized that the correct structure need not consist in a mathematical refinement and explanation of the Dirac method, but rather that it requires a procedure differing from the very beginning, namely, the reliance on the Hilbert theory of operators. (von Neumann [1932], p. ix) That is, once we have the appropriate mathematical framework, there is no need for introducing deviant techniques in mathematics in order for us to formulate quantum mechanics.
The 1954 manuscript: a unified approach
One of the striking features of von Neumann's work is his search for an approach in which logic and the mathematical and physical theories we employ to explain the phenomena hang nicely together. This means that we should search for an account that admits different kinds of generalization, such as the following: Suppose we are considering a given type of physical system. The approach von Neumann tried to provide was such that the same framework that is used to describe a physical system with a finite number of degrees of freedom could be extended to accommodate a system with an infinite number of degrees. Moreover, the geometric structures associated with such descriptions should be such that they are also preserved and generalized when the extension to the infinite case is performed. Furthermore, the logic derived from the geometric structure should also be amenable to generalization. Finally, given the crucial role played by probability theory in physics (especially in quantum mechanics), and given the close connection that von Neumann saw between probability and logic, he searched for an approach that allowed probability to be adequately introduced in quantum mechanics, and which also made clear the relationship between logic and probability. These are broad constraints and von Neumann adopted them as heuristic devices in theory construction. As we shall see, they played a crucial role in his program.
These points are clearly formulated in an unpublished paper that von Neumann presented in 1954 in the Congress of the Mathematicians in Amsterdam. Half a century after Hilbert's celebrated 1900 paper on mathematical problems, von Neumann was asked to consider further unsolved problems in mathematics. And he emphasized the importance of providing a unified approach to logic, probability and physics. Once again, he was keen on exploring analogies and structural similarities between different domains of mathematics and physics. He first considered classical physics, its underlying logic and probability, in a finite context:
If you take a classical mechanism of logics, and [...] limit yourself to logics referred to a finite set, it is perfectly clear that logics in that range are equivalent to the theory of all subsets of that finite set, and that probability means that you have attributed weights to single points, that you can attribute a probability to each event, which means essentially that the logical treatment corresponds to set theory in that domain and that a probabilistic treatment corresponds to introducing measures. (von Neumann [1954], p. 21) However, given the importance that von Neumann attached to generalizations, it would be important to extend these considerations to the infinite case. But this can be done without difficulties:
But it is quite possible to extend this to the usual infinite sets. And one also has this parallelism that logics corresponds to set theory and probability theory corresponds to measure theory and that given a system of logics, so given a system of sets, if all is right, you can introduce measures, you can introduce probability [....] . (von Neumann [1954], p. 21) Note, in particular, the structural analogies von Neumann introduces between logic and set theory, on the one hand, and between probability and measure theory, on the other. The idea is that there are structural relations between these domains, and he explores them in order to find a unified approach.
Things become more delicate when we try to extend this unified picture to quantum mechanics:
In the quantum mechanical machinery the situation is quite different. Namely instead of the sets use the linear subsets of a suitable space, say of a Hilbert space. The set-theoretical situation of logics is replaced by the machinery of projective geometry, which in itself is quite simple. (von Neumann [1954], p. 21) As it could be expected, the delicate part consists in the introduction of probability:
However, all quantum mechanical probabilities are defined as inner products of vectors. Essentially if a state of a system is given by one vector, the transition probability in another state is the inner product of the two which is the square of cosine of the angle between them. In other words, probability corresponds precisely to introducing the angles geometrically. Furthermore, there is only one way to introduce it. The more so because in the quantum mechanical machinery the negation of a statement, which is represented by a linear set of vectors, corresponds to the orthogonal complement of this linear space. And therefore, as soon as you have introduced into the projective geometry the ordinary machinery of logics, you must have introduced the concept of orthogonality. [...] So in order to have logics you need in this sense a projective geometry with a concept of orthogonality in it. (von Neumann [1954], pp. 21-22) In this way, logic and probability go hand to hand. As von Neumann stresses:
In order to have probability all you need is a concept of all angles, I mean angles other than 90 o . Now it is perfectly quite true that in a geometry, as soon as you can define the right angle, you can define all angles. Another way to put it is that, if you take the case of an orthogonal space, those mappings of this space on itself, which leave orthogonality intact, leave all angles intact; in other words, in those systems which can be used as models of the logical background for quantum theory, it is true that as soon as all the ordinary concepts of logics are fixed under some isomorphic transformation, all of probability theory is already fixed. (von Neumann [1954], p. 22) In conclusion, the unified approach could be achieved, in the sense that logics and probability theory arise simultaneously and are derived simultaneously. (von Neumann [1954], p. 22) The importance of these considerations is that, by putting forward a unified approach, von Neumann could provide a better understanding of logic, probability and physics. The search for such understanding is something that can be traced back to von Neumann's work in the 1930's, and he has explicitly discussed these topics in the unpublished manuscript of 1937 that I mentioned earlier (see von Neumann [1937b] ). As well as examining the relationship between the "dimension" of a physical system and its logic, which we considered above, in this work von Neumann also indicates how classical ("strict-") logic can be obtained as a particular case of probability logic. The main idea is again to provide an approach in which logic, probability and physics are closely tied together.
Let S be the physical system, or rather the mathematical model of a physical system, to which we wish to apply logics. The system L of logics is then the set of all statements a, b, c, ... which can be made concerning S. Such a statement is always one concerning the outcome of a certain measurement, which is to be performed on S. [...] The fundamental relations and operations for elements of L are these:
(I) The relation of "implication": a ≤ b. a ≤ b means this: If a measurement of a on S has shown a to be true, then an immediately subsequent measurement of b on S will certainly show b to be true. (II) The operation of "negation": ¬a.
¬a obtains as follows: The same measurement which is used to decide about the validity of a is also used to decide about the validity of ¬a, but when the result concerning the validity of a is "yes", then the one concerning ¬a is "no", and conversely. (von Neumann [1937b], pp. 3-4) The operations of conjunction and disjunction can also be defined (von Neumann [1937b] , p. 5), which leads von Neumann to call L the system of "strict logics" (ibid., p. 6). However, as he notes, when we apply L to "physical reality", a further structure emerges, which can only be expressed in terms of probability (ibid.).
For any well defined state of our knowledge concerning the mathematical description of physical reality, that is for any reasonable model S, a probability function exists. So we have in L:
(VI) The (real number-valued) function called "probability function": P(a, b). P(a, b) = θ (θ a real number) means this: If a measurement of a on S has shown a to be true, then the probability of an immediately subsequent measurement of b on S showing b to be true, is equal to θ. If we consider the structure which L aquires by making use of the function P(a, b) − that is, of all relations P(a, b) = θ (of course necessarily 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1) − then L appears as a new system, which we will call the system of "probability logics". (von Neumann [1937b], pp. 6-7) But what is the relation between strict-and probability-logics? It is clear enough: the former is a particular case of the latter.
It is easy to see that the system of strict logics is part of the system of probability logics, since a ≤ b, ¬a can be defined in terms of P(a, b) = θ (0 ≤ θ ≤ 1). Indeed (VI) makes the following statements obvious: However, there is no "reduction" of probability-logic to strict-logic. And in this sense, since probability-logic naturally arises in the context of physical theories, it cannot be dismissed as irrelevant, and to some extent it is even irreducible.
For a θ with 0 < θ < 1, however, no such "reduction" of P(a, b) = θ to strict logics seems possible. (von Neumann [1937b], p. 8) In other words:
Probability logics cannot be reduced to strict logics, but constitutes an essentially wider system than the latter, and statements of the form P(a, b) = θ (0 < θ < 1) are perfectly new and sui generis aspects of physical reality. (von Neumann [1937b], pp. 9-10) The point of these remarks is to indicate the importance that von Neumann assigned to the development of an integrated approach to physics, logic and probability, and how he used this as a heuristic constraint in theory construction. More importantly, he was clear in not claiming that a unified theory is more likely to be true than a less unified one (von Neumann [1947] , p. 7), and in this sense, such unification was only a pragmatic feature, not an epistemic one.
12 This is again an empiricist (and anti-realist) component in his work.
But von Neumann's work in the foundations of probability and quantum theory led him to articulate elements of what we now recognize as an empiricist version of the semantic approach. Together with his empiricism with regard to logic and mathematics, this constitutes the third empiricist trend in von Neumann's thought. To this issue we shall turn now.
Von Neumann and the semantic approach
As is well known, the semantic approach to science supplies a new perspective to the issue of the structure of scientific theories. The main components of this approach, in the formulation provided by van Fraassen, are: the use of models of data to represent empirical information; the employment of state-spaces to represent theoretical information; the adoption of laws of succession to represent the evolution of a physical system; and the requirement of empirical adequacy as a major criterion of theory choice (see van Fraassen [1980] , [1989] and [1991] ). As we shall see now, each of these four components were clearly formulated by von Neumann − in a strictly empiricist way (see also Suppe [1989] and ).
With regard to models of data (observation space), von Neumann and Birkhoff are explicit:
It is clear that an "observation" of a physical system M can be described generally as a writing down of the readings from various compatible measurements. Thus if the measurements are denoted by the symbols µ 1 ,...,µ n , then an observation of M amounts to specifying numbers x 1 , ..., x n corresponding to the different µ k .
12 As von Neumann reminds us: "The attitude that theoretical physics does not explain the phenomena, but only classifies and correlates, is today accepted by most theoretical physicists. [This attitude is of course clearly spelled out by Duhem [1906] , when he distinguished the explanation of the phenomena (i.e. the search for their underlying causes) from their classification (i.e. to provide structural representations for them). Von Neumann is clearly siding with Duhem's anti-realism about unobservable entities here.] This means that the criterion of success for such a theory is simply whether it can, by a simple and elegant classifying and correlating scheme, cover very many phenomena, which without this scheme would seem complicated and heterogeneous, and whether the scheme even covers phenomena which were not considered or even not known at the time when the scheme was evolved. (These two latter statements express, of course, the unifying and predicting power of a theory. It follows that the most general form of a prediction concerning M is that the point (x 1 ,...,x n ) determined by actually measuring µ 1 , ..., µ n , will lie in a subset S of (x 1 ,...,x n )-space. Hence if we call the (x 1 ,...,x n )-spaces associated with M, its "observation-spaces", we may call the subsets of the observation-spaces associated with any physical system M, the "experimental propositions" concerning M. (Birkhoff and von Neumann [1936], p. 106) Furthermore, von Neumann also formulates the notion of a state-space (phase-space), which is crucial for the representation of theoretical information:
According to this concept [phase-space], any physical system M is at each instant hypothetically associated with a "point" p in a fixed phase-space Σ; this point is supposed to represent mathematically the "state" of M, and the "state" of M is supposed to be ascertainable by "maximal" observations. (Birkhoff and von Neumann [1936] , p. 106) 13 The third component of the semantic approach, the introduction of laws of succession (law of propagation), is then explicitly considered:
Furthermore, the point p 0 associated with M at a time t 0 , together with a prescribed mathematical "law of propagation", fix the point p t associated with M at any later time t. (Birkhoff and von Neumann [1936], p. 106) As examples to illustrate these concepts, von Neumann mentions a few cases (note the reference to function spaces, which are subsequently articulated by Redhead [1975] ):
Thus in classical mechanics, each point of Σ corresponds to a choice of n position and n conjugate momentum coordinates − and the law of propagation may be Newton's inverse-square law of attraction. Hence in this case Σ is a region of ordinary 2n-dimensional space. In electrodynamics, the points of Σ can only be specified after certain functions − such as the electromagnetic and electrostatic potential − are known; hence Σ is a functionspace of infinitely many dimensions. Similarly, in quantum theory the points of Σ correspond to so-called "wavefunctions", and hence Σ is again a function-space − usually assumed to be Hilbert space. (Birkhoff and von Neumann [1936], p. 106) As further examples, Birkhoff and von Neumann consider:
In electrodynamics, the law of propagation is contained in Maxwell's equations, and in quantum theory, in equations due to Schrödinger. In any case, the law of propagation may be imagined as inducing a steady fluid motion in the phase-space. (Birkhoff and von Neumann [1936], p. 106) The last component of the semantic approach, which is particularly important in the context of an empiricist view, is the formulation of a convenient notion of empirical adequacy. After spelling out the mathematical content of models of data and state-spaces, von Neumann indicates the importance of assigning empirical content to the models considered; otherwise, we would be considering only mathematical structures. Now before a phase-space can become imbued with reality [empirical content], its elements and subsets must be correlated in some way with "experimental propositions" (which are subsets of different observation-spaces). Moreover, this must be so done that set-theoretical inclusion (which is the analogue of logical implication) is preserved. (Birkhoff and von Neumann [1936], p. 107) In other words, a physical theory is empirically adequate if there is a transformation between certain components of the state-space and the data models that preserves the relevant relations; that is, which assigns to the observable components of the state-space a counterpart in the models of data.
Note that, in this passage, when von Neumann talks about imbuing the state-space with "reality", he is not adding a realist gloss to the resulting formalism. He is actually talking about the empirical content of the theory under consideration. This is clear for the following reasons: Firstly, von Neumann was careful in not adding a realist gloss to his claims. He insisted that the unificatory and predictive components of a theory are only aesthetic, pragmatic features, and not epistemic (see von Neumann [1947] , p. 7), and the fact that a theory is unified and empirically successful doesn't increase the probability that it is true. Of course, this move meshes nicely with an empiricist approach. Secondly, in a remark made immediately after the passage I've just quoted, von Neumann explicitly considers the empirical substructures of the state-spaces (the components which refer only to the observables of a physical system, and which are crucial for an empiricist view):
There is an obvious way to do this in dynamical systems of the classical type. One can measure position and its first time-derivative velocity − and hence momentum − explicitly, and so establish a one-one correspondence which preserves inclusion between subsets of phase-space and subsets of a suitable observation space. (Birkhoff and von Neumann [1936], p. 107) quantum logic is often used to support a realist interpretation of quantum mechanics, wasn't von Neumann a realist after all? The problem with this suggestion lies in the assumption that quantum logic supports realism. Surely there are quantum-logical interpretations that are meant to enhance the realist position; this is the case of Putnam's view (see Putnam [1968] and [1976] , and for a discussion Bub [1981b] , and da Costa [1997] ). However, quantum logic, as such, is not necessarily tied to realism. When Putnam articulated his version of quantum logic, he added to the quantum-logical approach a realist gloss. But this is not necessary. It is interesting to note that van Fraassen himself, while not sharing the realist additions to quantum logic, has formulated his modal interpretation of quantum mechanics quantum-logically (see van Fraassen [1991] ). In other words, quantum logic provides a broad conceptual framework in which both realists and anti-realists can work. The distinctions between these two kinds of interpretations (realist and anti-realist) arise from the different assumptions they add. The importance of this is that we can understand why von Neumann's formulation of quantum logic wasn't articulated as part of a realist enterprise. Given his concerns with structures and the lack of a realist gloss over them, it meshes more smoothly with an empiricist outlook.
Logic and constructive empiricism
But it is not only in the formulation of the semantic approach, and in the role assigned to quantum logic that von Neumann's and van Fraassen's approaches are related; they also share a similar kind of logical pluralism. And of course this pluralism makes a lot of sense in an empiricist setting. According to van Fraassen, the correctness of a logical system is always relative, and in this sense, the question about the determination of the right logic cannot be addressed in absolute terms:
A logical system is considered correct for a language if it provides a catalogue of the valid inferences in that language. So the question "Which is the right logic?" may perhaps be rephrased as: Assuming that natural language is adequately represented by a certain formal language L, what logic is correct for L from a semantic point of view? (van Fraassen [1971], p. 3) As a result, we cannot talk about the correct logic in absolute terms, but we have to consider the particular context (the particular domain or language) we are concerned with.
From the semantic point of view, the correct logic is always derivative: It is found by examining semantic relations (defined in terms of truth, reference, and so on) among statements. Thus, if what the intuitionist means by his statements is understood, it can then be seen that intuitionistic logic is the correct logic for his language. (van Fraassen [1971], p. 4) So, just as von Neumann stressed the context-dependence of logic (we have different logics depending on the empirical domain we are examining), van Fraassen emphasizes the languagedependence of logic. In both cases the outcome is clear enough:
Since we have now denied that there is a unique logic we must face the charge of a self-defeating relativism. For what logical system shall govern the appraisal of our own reasoning in semantic inquiry? Our answer to this is fairly straightforward: In Metalogic we use a part of natural language commonly known as "mathematical English", in which we describe and discuss only mathematical (that is, set-theoretic) objects. (van Fraassen [1971] , p. 4; the italics are mine) 15 However, van Fraassen adds, despite his talk of set-theoretic objects, he is by no means a platonist:
We are deliberately speaking of mathematical objects in the idiom of naive platonism; the reader is asked not to infer that this is our position in philosophy of mathematics. After all, any philosophy of mathematics must eventually make sense of the common language of mathematical mankind. (van Fraassen [1971] , p. 5, note 6)
The idea is to make sense of the mathematical language without inflating the ontology, that is, without assuming platonism, and advocating a logical pluralism.
Given van Fraassen's rejection of the existence of a unique (correct) logic, he claims that a logic is correct only relative to a given domain. According to him, "we accept classical logic as correct within a certain (perhaps rather limited) domain" (van Fraassen [1971] , p. 5; the italics are mine). This is, of course, the natural position for the empiricist, since it avoids the essentialism typical of a topic neutral account of logic. It is this domain dependence of logic that von Neumann explored so fruitfully in his work in the foundations of quantum mechanics. The logic he was then exploring was the logic of elementary statements, and for the reasons discussed in Birkhoff and von Neumann [1936] , this logic is correct for the language of these statements.
The point of these considerations is simple. If we adopt a broad notion of empiricism (namely, constructive empiricism), we can understand how one can be an empiricist in mathematics. It doesn't require any form of reductionism of mathematics to the observable (just as van Fraassen's approach doesn't require any such reduction in science), but it allows mathematics and logic to be motivated and changed on empirical grounds. This form of empiricism is by no means foreign to mathematical practice, but it has informed, as I indicated here, von Neumann's own approach to mathematics.
CONCLUSION
Von Neumann adopted a clear empiricist and pluralist view about logic, which played an important role in the development of his research both in the foundations of quantum mechanics (with the formulation of quantum logic) and in mathematics itself (with the creation of continuous geometry). However, these two features are by no means incompatible with the adoption of a classical attitude with regard to the practice of mathematics; in particular, with regard to the rejection of inconsistencies (such as those found in Dirac's use of the δ-function).
The answer to the question Was von Neumann an empiricist? should now be clear. As we saw above, a number of factors support a positive answer, since according to von Neumann: (1) mathematical theories are often created from physical, empirical demands (first empiricist feature); (2) logic should be inspired by experience (second empiricist feature); (3) logic can be revised on empirical grounds (third empiricist feature); (4) there are as many logics as physical phenomena demand (logical pluralism); (5) the demand for new logics arises from experience (logical anti-apriorism); and finally (6) von Neumann clearly formulated the semantic approach, with special emphasis on the empirical adequacy of the resulting theories, rather than their truth.
If these considerations are still not enough, I shall leave the last word to von Neumann himself, quoting a passage which leaves room for no doubt:
As a mathematical discipline travels far from its empirical source, or still more, if it is a second and third generation only indirectly inspired by ideas coming from "reality", it is beset with very grave dangers. It becomes more and more purely aestheticizing, more and more purely l'art pour l'art. This need not be bad, if the field is surrounded by correlated subjects, which still have closer empirical connections [...] . But there is a grave danger that the subject will develop along the line of least resistance, that the stream, so far from its source, will separate into a multitude of insignificant complexities. In other words, at a great distance from its empirical source, or after much "abstract" inbreeding, a mathematical subject is in danger of degeneration. (von Neumann [1947] ; the italics are mine)
